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Thinking About Polygamy 
SANFORD LEVINSON* 
“In United States history,” Professor Calhoun begins her paper, “there 
have been four important bars to civil marriage.”1  These four, she says, 
involve marriages between slaves, marriages across racial lines, 
polygamous marriages, and same-sex marriages.  She is, of course, 
absolutely correct that these are “four important bars to civil marriage” 
that have operated within our history as a nation (or, previously, as 
colonies of Great Britain).  Yet the sentence is subtly misleading if it is 
taken to mean that these constitute an exhaustive list of “important bars.”  
Consider, for example, the prohibitions of incestuous marriages and the 
use of minimum-age requirements to prevent “underage” marriage 
(which thereby becomes the equivalent of statutory rape). 
Perhaps they are excluded from the list because of an assumption that 
few people actually wish to engage in incestuous or “underage” 
marriage.  This is obviously an empirical, rather than conceptual, 
question, and the actual evidence, assuming we could easily ascertain it, 
might be more complicated than one would assume.  As to incest, a 2002 
report published in The Journal of Genetic Counseling noted that “[i]n 
some parts of the world . . . 20 to 60 percent of all marriages are between 
 *  W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
University of Texas Law School.  I am very grateful to Larry Alexander and Steven 
Smith for both inviting me to the very interesting conference on marriage at the 
University of San Diego School of Law and being extremely gracious hosts.  I am also 
grateful to the other participants for their consistently interesting and provocative 
arguments, even (or especially) when I disagreed with them.  The general topic, as one 
can easily predict, is extremely controversial, and all too much public discussion settles 
for polemic and posturing.  None of this was present during the discussion, where 
strikingly different views were presented with courtesy even if with suitable intensity. 
 1. Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex 
Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023 (2005). 




close biological relatives.”2  If we include the marriage of cousins within 
the definition of incest, then I would be somewhat surprised if incestuous 
marriages in American history have not been at least as frequent as the 
number of polygamous marriages even during the heyday of the 
unreformed Mormon Church,3 not to mention the present practices of 
those “renegade” Mormons (at least from the perspective of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) who refuse to accept the 1890 
reversal by the LDS of the duty to engage in polygamy.4  Similarly, there 
is no particular reason to believe that marriages involving quite young 
individuals are so rare as one might hope.  Older readers might recall 
rock star Jerry Lee Lewis’s marriage some years ago to a thirteen-year-old 
cousin5—indeed, since he apparently had not yet divorced his current 
wife, Lewis’s marriage presumably qualifies as incestuous, bigamous, 
and underage all at once!—even as younger ones might have read about 
Mary Kay Letourneau, who as a thirty-three-year-old teacher entered into 
a sexual relationship with a twelve-year-old male student, whom she 
married after serving a seven-year prison term for rape.6 
In part, I think that Professor Calhoun’s list reveals the continuing 
(and inevitable) power of unexamined background assumptions even as 
the central thrust of her paper is to challenge certain of these assumptions.  
Consider in this context the fact that we often refer casually to American 
politics being based on “universal suffrage,” ignoring, for starters, the 
tens of millions of children who are not entitled to vote.  The reason that 
this exclusion—unlike, say, the exclusion of felons from voting in many 
states—is almost never thought to challenge the assertion of “universal 
suffrage” is that “we”7 assume that the exclusion is perfectly sensible 
and that, indeed, any argument to the contrary would be, to say the least, 
questionable. (“Do you really mean to allow a five-year-old to vote?  
That’s just crazy!”)  It is not that the restriction of suffrage to adults, at 
 2. See Denise Grady, Few Risks Seen to the Children of 1st Cousins, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 4, 2002, at A1. 
 3. As Ms. Grady writes: 
It is not known how many cousins marry or live together.  Estimates of 
marriages between related people, which include first cousins and more distant 
ones, range from less than 0.1 percent of the general population to 1.5 percent.  
In the past, small studies have found much higher rates in some areas.  A 
survey in 1942 found 18.7 percent in a small town in Kentucky and a 1980 
study found 33 percent in a Mennonite community in Kansas. 
Id. 
 4. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 1029. 
 5. See Rotten.com, Jerry Lee Lewis, http://www.rotten.com/library/bio/entertainers/music/ 
jerry-lee-lewis/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2005). 
 6. Letourneau Marries Former Student Fualaau: Notorious Pair Weds Following 
Teacher’s Release from Prison, MSNBC, May 21, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7926717/. 
 7. The “scare quotes” are intentional because, inevitably, the existence of the 
community that makes such judgments can itself become a major bone of contention. 
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least legally defined, is not important; it is that we cannot take seriously 
a critique of the exclusion of children.  For most, the same would be true 
regarding the restriction of suffrage to citizens and the concomitant 
exclusion of long-term resident aliens.  “Universal suffrage” is just 
thought to mean the availability of the vote to adult law-abiding citizens.  
Those who are in fact excluded are, in some sense, not viewed as part of 
the relevant universe. 
So Professor Calhoun is smuggling a highly normative, rather than 
merely empirical, claim into her assertion of what counts as an “important” 
bar to civil marriage.  No one, one assumes, would wish to defend prior 
bans on slave or interracial marriages.8  In some ways, her paper is 
written to those who believe, as I do, that the prohibition of same-sex 
marriages is no more defensible than those earlier bans, and she asks 
whether the same legal tolerance should be added to polygamous marriage.  
But, as noted, she does not ask similar questions about incestuous or 
underage marriage.  I assume the reason is that she herself would not credit 
any argument made by, say, a brother and sister that respect for their 
autonomy should entitle them to a marriage license.  Or she may simply 
be making a tactical judgment that it would be far too costly to her own 
political aims to suggest analogies to incestuous marriage.  Consider 
what use social conservatives would make of a frank admission by a 
proponent of same-sex marriage that the same arguments (especially if 
based on a strong theory of autonomy) would indeed apply to incest.9  It 
is easier, in every sense, to hope that no one will think of incest. 
 8. Though, as became clear in the discussions at the conference at which this 
paper was initially presented, if one views marriage primarily through the lens of  “what 
is good for children” rather than a more libertarian “is there any legitimate reason to 
prevent adults from acting autonomously in matters of love,” then the arguments against 
same-sex marriage would seemingly apply to interracial marriage or, for that matter, 
interreligious marriage, inasmuch as there would certainly be some plausible, albeit 
disputed, evidence that children in what might be termed “heterogeneous” marriages 
may have more social difficulties than children from “homogeneous” marriages. 
 9. Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum made just such a connection in a 2003 
interview condemning the possibility (which, of course, turned out to be the reality) that 
the Supreme Court’s would overturn Texas’s laws barring same-sex sodomy.  “If the 
Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within your home, 
then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to 
incest, you have the right to adultery.”  Sean Loughlin, Two Republicans Criticize Santorum 
for Remarks About Gays, CNN, Apr. 24, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/ 
04/24/santorum.gays. 




It is useful to recall, in this context, the twists and turns in Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,10 when he attempted to 
differentiate the (putatively illegitimate) ban by Georgia on what the 
majority insisted on calling “homosexual sodomy” and its bans of adult 
incest and adultery.11  It is, after all, difficult to defend these two bans on 
anything other than purely “moral” grounds.  This is especially the case 
with adult incest, which can be viewed as a “victimless crime,” unlike 
incest involving children or adultery. 
The standard “genetic” argument that is often trotted out with regard 
to adult incest—children of incestuous parents are more likely to have 
certain birth defects—is riddled with holes;12 indeed, I am tempted to 
describe it simply as bogus.  Begin with the fact that it is, in the modern 
world, extraordinarily under-inclusive if the genuine concern is 
protecting the gene pool or simply reducing the risk of children born 
with certain defects.  We now live in a world that, for better and worse, 
allows genetic testing of all who wish to get married; if the state truly 
cares about protecting the gene pool or prospective children, then it 
could obviously refuse a marriage license  to any couple whose genetic 
match is, in the view of the state, suboptimal.  I obviously put to one 
side whether we would tolerate such a move toward state-mandated 
eugenics.  The central point is that one can scarcely limit one’s eugenic 
impulses to the trifling number of incestuous unions as against the far 
more likely number of “ill-matched” nonrelated couples.  The “genetic” 
argument is also, and just as obviously, over-inclusive with regard to 
those siblings who might be sterile and thus unable to give birth.  The 
use of the “scientific” argument against incest is, therefore, simply a 
subterfuge for the “moral” argument that one is ultimately making. 
The same is true of adultery.  Although adultery can be viewed as a 
“crime” with a “victim,” it can also be viewed, as Justice Blackmun 
himself suggested, as simply a breach of promise (or contract).13  And it 
is a fundamental truth of our particular legal order that we almost never 
“punish” people for breaching contracts, even if we allow the victims of 
a breach to sue for damages.  Again, the only plausible rationale for 
criminalizing adultery is that one is morally offended by that particular 
breach in a way that one is not morally offended by other breaches of 
promise; indeed, one may be a fan of theories of “efficient breach” that 
encourage promise-breaking in certain instances,14 which might even 
 10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 11. Id. at 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 12. See Grady, supra note 2. 
 13. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 209 n.4. 
 14. The theory of “efficient breach” of contract was apparently first articulated by 
Robert Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency,  
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extend to countenancing adultery when the adulterer’s gains are greater 
than the cuckolded spouse’s losses (and, by stipulation, the errant spouse 
has compensated the victim, perhaps through a generous divorce 
settlement).  So the problem facing Justice Blackmun, which I dare say 
he did not solve with flying colors, is to explain why society, acting 
through the state, can exhibit its moralism with regard to incest and 
adultery, but not to “homosexual sodomy.”15 
Justice White had a different problem in his majority opinion:16 he had 
to reassure heterosexuals, who survey data suggest are active and eager 
participants in oral sex17 (which usually counts under state law as 
“sodomy”18), that they were not at risk of punishment in Georgia (or 
anywhere else).  So he simply rewrote the Georgia statute, which did not 
in fact differentiate between straights and gays, to apply only to 
“homosexual sodomy,”19 with the negative pregnant, for the majority of 
heterosexual Americans, that their own rights to engage in fellatio and 
24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).  See also Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach 
Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989). 
 15. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
 16. Id. at 188. 
 17. See Schochet v. State, 541 A.2d 183, 206 n.3 (Md. App. 1988): 
In his first report, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948), Alfred Kinsey 
found that fewer than half of the men interviewed engaged in fellatio or 
cunnilingus, even during marriage. In the category of highest incidence—married 
men with 13+ years of education—45.3% performed cunnilingus and 42.7% 
engaged in fellatio. Five years later, in his Sexual Behavior in the Human 
Female, Kinsey reported that 54% of the married women interviewed had 
engaged in pre-coital cunnilingus and 49% had engaged in fellatio. See also P. 
Gebhard and A. Johnson, The Kinsey Data (1979). In their 1977 Redbook 
Report on Female Sexuality, C. Tavris and S. Sadd found that 93% of wives 
responding reported having engaged in cunnilingus and 91% had engaged in 
fellatio. They concluded from this response that, “Today it is clear that if the 
sexual revolution has occurred anywhere, it is in the practice and acceptance of 
oral sex. Among people under age twenty-five, it is virtually a universal part of 
the sexual relationship.” 
    P. Blumsteln and P. Schwartz have reported similar statistics—93% of 
heterosexual couples had engaged in cunnilingus and 90% had engaged in 
fellatio. See also W. Masters, V. Johnson, and R. Kolodny, Human Sexuality 
393 (1985). Nor is this phenomenon confined to the young. E. Brecher reports 
In Love, Sex, and Aging 358–59 (1984), that, among people over 50, 49% of 
women and 56% of men engaged in cunnilingus and 43% of women and 49% 
of men engaged in fellatio. 
Id. 
 18. For a listing of sodomy laws, see Sodomy Laws, http://www.sodomylaws. 
org/usa/usa.htm (last modified Apr. 30, 2005). 
 19. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 




cunnilingus (and probably even anal sex) were not at risk, even as the 
state could prohibit similar behavior when engaged in by same-sex 
couples.  Thankfully, Lawrence 20 brought an end to this foolishness, though 
Justice Kennedy scarcely did any better than Justice Blackmun in 
offering a full explanation of the reach (and limits) of the libertarianism 
that seemingly underlay the opinion.21 
So what remains clear is that some degree of social moralism is 
constitutionally acceptable even in a liberal constitutional order, though, 
as a matter of fact, we have no particularly good way of offering a 
satisfactory theoretical account of what is acceptable.  The best that most 
lawyers can do is to engage in a basically quasi-sociological, Holmesian, 
reading of the law that predicts judicial activity on the basis of the 
judges’ own likely views about given behaviors.  This allows me to say 
with some confidence that the Court will strike down a given instance of 
social moralism when it becomes viewed by significant portions of the 
society, including, especially, elites with whom judges tend to identify, 
as “oppressive” rather than “constitutive” of a decent society.  Thus, it 
seems extremely probable that the Court will definitely not, in any 
foreseeable future, look kindly on a brother and sister or adult parent and 
adult child who wish to have sex with one another or, even more 
certainly, get married to one another, despite the fact that many of us are 
quite confident (even if some rue rather than applaud) that the Court 
will, in the not too distant future—say ten to twenty years—find the ban 
on same-sex marriage to be as objectionable, constitutionally, as the 
earlier ban on interracial marriage.  The task would be considerably 
more difficult if lawyers were held to the same standards as philosophers 
and had to present plausible systematic accounts of the lines we draw 
with regard to what is acceptable or unacceptable. 
In any event, it is the obvious political, even if not “philosophical,” 
difference between same-sex and adult-incestuous marriage that, by 
analogy, offers the best answer to Professor Calhoun’s perhaps artfully 
naïve inquiry as to why proponents of same-sex marriage are not eager 
to ask, at least in public, “And indeed, why not also polygamy?”22  If I 
were advising gay- and lesbian-rights groups, I would heartily counsel 
them to distance themselves from the socially marginal groups that today 
advocate polygamy.  There would be little to gain, and possibly much to 
lose, by embracing the strange practices of decidedly off-putting people 
from Utah and Arizona as part of the argument on behalf of better 
treatment for gays and lesbians.  But this is, obviously, entirely a 
 20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 21. See id. at 562–79. 
 22. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 1027. 
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political point.  It has nothing at all to do with the philosophical and 
empirical arguments that take up the remainder of her paper.23 
As it happens, I am in substantial agreement with Professor Calhoun 
that polygamy may have at least enough to be said for it that it should 
not be banned in contemporary American society, especially given the 
legal and social toleration today of what some call the “serial polygamy” 
that is the consequence of the easy availability of “no fault” divorce.24  
To be sure, some of the participants at the San Diego conference clearly 
indicated their unhappiness at this development in American society; 
they would clearly love to turn the clock back to a time when divorce 
was, at the very least, difficult, if not, indeed, impossible.  But even they 
recognized that there is simply no possibility, within contemporary 
America, of any such literally “reactionary” development.  For better 
and, perhaps, worse, we are, as a society, irrevocably committed to 
privileging individual autonomy over the presumptive social benefits of 
preserving marriages. 
The easiest defense of polygamy, of course, would be based on 
individual autonomy.  If consenting adults wish to live in such a 
relationship, why ought not the state allow it?  Or, to put it in standard 
constitutional terms, why should it not be a violation of equal protection 
of the law if Alice, Brad, and Carol are not allowed to purchase the same 
marriage license that Alice and Brad or Brad and Carol would 
presumably be allowed to purchase?  (Obviously, there is also the 
possibility that Alice and Carol would like to purchase a license.)  What 
particular interest does the state have in restricting the legal boon of 
marital status to two persons instead of three (or more)? 
One answer sounds in social morality, but, of course, it is just such an 
answer that is ruled out by many forms of “liberal” theory, which require 
that the state be neutral among different moral views, at least in the 
absence of demonstrable harm to third parties. 
Much of the discussion in San Diego, especially about same-sex 
marriage, attempted to deflect attention from the unabashed “moral” 
argument (that same-sex marriage flouts natural law) by offering a more 
consequentialist form of argument that attempted to discern harms in the 
practice.  That is, several participants suggested that same-sex marriages 
 23. Id. at 1027–42. 
 24. Id. at 1031 (citing Nancy Rosenblum, Democratic Sex: Reynolds v. U.S., 
Sexual Relations, and Community, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW 
AND NATURE 78 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997)). 




are bad for children, because there is something very important about 
being raised by parents of two sexes.25  Not surprisingly, one response 
was that the evidence is decidedly mixed on this point; it was suggested, 
for example, that the very worst situation for a child is a household 
consisting of the birth mother and a live-in boyfriend.  Similar arguments 
were heard, especially with regard to the question of whether a liberal 
state had any business encouraging the institution of marriage at all, 
about the presumptive costs to children of being raised by single parents, 
whether male or female. 
Consider, though, another argument made in defense of marriage as a 
social institution to be encouraged by state policies.  Several people 
suggested, altogether plausibly, that a boon of marriage is precisely the 
“til death do we part” promise (whether or not it actually describes 
reality) that makes it more likely than it might otherwise be that our 
(married) partners will take care of us when we are old and sick.  And 
concomitantly, that we will choose to take care of our ailing partners 
even if we are in fine form because, after all, we promised to.  As 
someone sailing ever more rapidly into what is euphemistically called 
one’s “sunset years,” I am not at all disrespectful of such arguments. 
The hook, though, is that if one assesses marriage not as an idealistic 
“meeting of two minds” or joinder of “soul mates” and the like, but 
rather as an institution focused, in the early stages on rearing children, 
and then later on taking care of ailing partners, then polygamy begins to 
look better and better.  Begin with the children: There is no reason at all 
why a child who benefits from the presence of two parental caregivers 
would not benefit even more from the presence of more adults (and 
half-brothers and half-sisters) that would have their welfare at heart.  Even 
if one is a Darwinist (as were several people in San Diego) and therefore 
committed to the view that “birth parents” are more likely to be interested in 
the welfare of their children (that is, their genes) than are other nongenetic 
contributors to the child, one might still believe that non-birth parents or 
caregivers, if treated as part of the “family,” will be beneficial rather 
than detrimental to child welfare (not to mention the often harried 
parents forced to cope by themselves with the tasks of childrearing).  
This is, after all, simply a form of the “extended family” argument. 
One might argue, of course, that children of polygamous families 
would suffer a certain social opprobrium, but this has nothing more to 
commend it than the argument that children should be protected by the 
 25. Whether there are only “two sexes” is beyond the scope of this brief Comment.  
Though consider the existence of hermaphrodites, transsexuals, and others who fit quite 
uneasily within the standard, unexamined assumption that there are two-and-only-two 
bins within which all of us can be sorted. 
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state from participating in interracial families.  The Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected such an argument in Palmore v. Sidoti,26 where the 
judge below had assigned custody of a teenage child to her father instead 
of her mother solely because the white mother had entered into a 
relationship with an African-American.27  This would, said the judge, 
serve to protect the child from the inevitable social tensions attached to 
being viewed by outsiders as a member of an interracial household.28  
The opinion in Palmore is remarkably short 29—as is basically true with 
respect to Loving v. Virginia,30 the case unanimously striking down 
Virginia’s antimiscegenation law in 196731—conveying the notion that the 
Supreme Court saw literally no merit in the argument that the state could 
in effect honor the bigoted views of many of its citizens by incorporating 
them into its determination of what is in the “best interests of the 
child.”32  The best way of understanding Palmore is as a declaration that 
when determining such interests judges must assume, albeit counterfactually, 
that our society lives up to the demands of our liberal social order.  If 
that is correct with regard to the legitimacy of taking race into account 
when deciding how children should be raised, then the same argument 
would seemingly apply with regard to whether a child is in a monogamous 
or polygamous (or, of course, same-sex) home. 
It is with regard to caregiving at the end of life that the arguments for 
polygamy seem strongest.  After all, what we are talking about is a form 
of social insurance.  We are seeking not only financial contributions from 
the income streams of our mates—those we could get by purchasing an 
adequate insurance policy—but also a reasonable likelihood that we will 
be taken care of in our dotage, when we are least likely to be particularly 
attractive in the overall social marketplace, by someone who actually 
cares about us and is thus indifferent to the availability of “better” mates 
in the outside market.  It may be true that one’s partner in a monogamous 
marriage is marginally more likely to do that than a partner in a 
polygamous marriage, though for obvious reasons there is nothing that 
can count as real data on the point. 
 26. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 27. Id. at 430–31. 
 28. Id. at 431. 
 29. The entire opinion is only five pages long.  Id. at 430–34. 
 30. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  The opinion here is eleven pages long.  
Id. at 2–12. 
 31. Id. at 2, 13. 
 32. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433. 
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But one is also taking a far greater risk by relying only on a single 
partner.  Retirement analysts emphasize the importance of diversifying 
one’s portfolio.  Sound “blue chips,” such as General Motors, AT&T, 
TWA, Penn Central, and the like (let alone Enron), might have undetected 
problems; one should put one’s retirement savings into a good index 
fund.  Similarly, if one is interested in being taken care of when one gets 
ill, a participant in even the most loving monogamous marriage is 
putting his or her eggs in one decidedly fragile basket.  Even putting 
aside personal “betrayals” of late-marriage divorces, there is always the 
possibility of accidents and fatal illnesses that remove the anticipated 
caregiver from the scene.  Incidentally, this is certainly true of women, 
who are, because of differences in life expectancies coupled with the fact 
that it continues to be the case that most husbands are older than the 
wives they marry, at far greater risk of being left alone than are their 
husbands.  This obviously suggests that polyandry may make more 
social sense than polygyny, unless one assumes that the multiple wives 
would indeed be willing to take care of one another even in the absence 
of the now-dead husband.  If legally recognized polygamy were available, 
one might easily foresee a relatively large number of “communal 
marriages” entered into by middle-aged or old-aged persons.  Though 
one should not ignore (or disdain) the likelihood of a sexual element in 
such marriages, the far more likely explanation would indeed be to make 
sure that one is less likely to be left alone as one gets older.  And, incidentally, 
one might expect the children of monogamous marriages to be especially 
approving of such communal marriages if the alternative is that the sick, 
now alone, parent will show up at their doorstep demanding that the 
children now provide the care the parent needs. 
Professor Calhoun provides a real service by opening up our minds with 
regard to our conceptualization of marriage-as-a-state-controlled-institution 
and her suggestion that we ought to be far more pluralistic than we are 
now with regard to what should count as a legally recognized marriage.  
I personally find her arguments unanswerable, unless one makes a strong 
argument that there is a transcendent morality regarding the institution of 
marriage that a liberal state can, and should, recognize.  But, of course, 
this is just to reopen the oldest question about political liberalism, which 
is the relationship between the public order and conflicting views of how 
best to lead one’s “private” life. 
 
